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Abstract:  Is international migration a threat to the redistributive programs of destination 
countries? Existing work is divided.  This paper examines the manner and extent to which 
increases in immigration are related to welfare state retrenchment, drawing on data from 1970 to 
2007.  The paper makes three contributions: (1) it explores the impact of changes in immigration 
on social welfare policy over both the short and medium term; (2) it examines the possibility that 
immigration matters for spending not just directly, but indirectly, through changes in 
demographics and/or the labour force; and (3) by disaggregating data on social expenditure into 
subdomains (including unemployment, pensions, and the like), it tests the impact of immigration 
on different elements of the welfare state.  Results suggest that increased immigration is indeed 
associated with smaller increases in spending. The major pathway is through impact on female 
labour force participation. The policy domains most affected are ones subject to moral hazard, or 
at least to rhetoric about moral hazard.  
 
 
 
 New patterns of international migration have altered the demographic landscape of liberal-
democratic countries. New forms of difference have generated new political pressures and 
sparked debates about traditional conceptions of identity and community, as well as the rights 
and mutual obligations embedded in citizenship. One sector where the new demography may 
have changed the rules is the welfare state. The nature of the relationship between migration and 
welfare state spending is as yet unclear: some researchers suggest that international migration 
will drive growth in the welfare state, while other research predicts the opposite (cf. Nannestad, 
2007; Portes and Vickstrom, 2011; Stichnoth and Straeten, 2013).  That said, almost none of this 
literature goes directly to the impact of international migration; almost without exception, the 
data are about ethnic diversity, where the latter is often the residue not of migration but of 
arbitrary boundary-making or historical patterns of racial or ethnic domination. Sometimes the 
evidence is subnational. 
One early paper that uses cross-national immigration data is Soroka et al. (2006), which 
finds a negative relationship between international migration and destination-country social 
spending. The current paper builds upon that earlier investigation in two ways. First, we update 
the general claim and find that the relationship is even more robust than before. Second, we are 
now able to disaggregate social spending into sub-domains, such as unemployment benefits, 
pensions, and the like. Where the earlier work barely allowed researchers to scratch the surface 
of causal inference, disaggregation enables us to compare domains for their political 
vulnerability. 
Migration and Social Welfare Spending 
Where the relationship between migration and welfare state spending is concerned, two 
strikingly different possibilities appear. One is that a large inflow of migrants will drive up social 
spending, especially in generous welfare states. This possibility reflects two expectations with 
both academic support and public resonance. The first is that migrants coming to the developed 
world from developing countries will be comparatively low-skilled and poorly educated, relative 
to both source and host countries (Borjas, 1994). The second is that these low-skilled migrants, 
well aware of the notable variance in welfare state generosity, will cluster in more generous 
welfare states. This “welfare magnet theory” (Borjas, 1999) suggests that migrants are more 
likely than native-born welfare recipients to engage in welfare shopping; this greater propensity 
toward welfare shopping results from the fact that for an immigrant, the cost of migration is 
offset by both lower wage dispersion in host countries and the more generous welfare state 
(whereas for the native-born, the latter factor alone would have to justify the cost of moving). 
Both the accuracy and the generalizability of these results have been the subject of 
considerable debate. On the accuracy question, for instance, Zavodny (1999) argues that Borjas’ 
findings are simply the result of the clustering of migrants in certain states where immigrant 
populations are already large, as they attempt to take advantage of pre-existing immigrant 
networks. On generalizability, the applicability of Borjas’ US-focused conclusions to 
international decisions about migration destination is contested — when migrants choose among 
destination countries (as opposed to simply choosing among US states), numerous other factors 
come into play. In an international setting, migration policy regimes, family reunification 
options, and cultural/linguistic similarities can all have considerable roles in directing the flow of 
migrants, with the result that the effect of welfare generosity may (at least in some instances) 
disappear (cf. Pedersen et al., 2004; Peridy, 2006). It is also possible that the relationship 
highlighted by the welfare magnet theory is endogenous, with the composition of immigrant 
groups or policy changes in reaction to immigration altering unemployment benefit spending 
(Giulietti et al., 2013). 
Existing cross-national research on the matter is divided. Concerns that generous welfare 
benefits may negatively affect levels of labour market participation of migrants have found some 
support in research (e.g. Constant and Schultz-Nielsen, 2004). Other researchers find that 
migrants are – albeit only marginally – more likely than non-migrants to be welfare recipients 
(Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Brücker et al., 2002). Moreover, the effect of migration on factor 
prices may in some instances counteract these negative effects (see Razin and Sadka, 2000). In 
general, the conclusion here suggests that migration in its current form is associated with 
somewhat smaller increases in welfare state expenditures (Nannestad, 2007). 
If the critiques just mentioned do not impugn the basic observational pattern, they do 
question the causal ordering or suggest conditions. A more rounded critique argues that the 
primary effect of international immigration is negative — it leads to decreases in social 
spending.  In this scenario, the impact is political rather than economic: increased migration 
shifts public attitudes towards a preference for welfare cutbacks (see, e.g., Freeman 1986; 
Nannestad 2007; Eger 2010; Burgoon et al. 2012). Regardless of whether migrants are actually 
choosing their destinations on the basis of welfare state generosity or are more welfare state-
reliant than native-born populations, concern about migration amongst native-born populations 
decreases aggregate support for redistributive policies. 
It is certainly true that public concern about migration and immigrant reliance on welfare 
benefits is on the rise throughout the developed world. “Welfare chauvinist” attitudes and 
political parties have seen a particular increase in Europe. This European phenomenon is in line 
with work focused on the US as well. The account offered in well-known work by Alesina and 
colleagues (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), for instance, is that anti-welfare 
state politicians in the US play upon racial stereotypes in their push to limit welfare benefits.   
The political motivations underlying welfare chauvinism may not be purely fiscal in 
nature. The literature on anti-immigrant attitudes suggests that economic concerns are often 
secondary to broader anxieties about the changing ethnic makeup of the national community 
(Sniderman et al., 2000; 2004; 2007). In particular, research along these lines builds on decades 
of work from social psychologists pointing to the importance of social groupings and consequent 
in-group/out biases (see Tajfel, 1981); under this perspective, certain categorical distinctions are 
deemed salient under specific circumstances, often due to factors such as low self-esteem and an 
uncertainty about a group’s dominant status in society (cf. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and 
Abrams, 1993). According to this argument, then, one would expect to see a link between 
increases in migration and decreases in social spending and redistributive policy more generally.  
Alongside work that finds a negative relationship between migration and welfare 
spending, however, there is a growing body of work suggesting that the main effects of 
migration on social spending are limited, or require mediation by other factors. Lipsmeyer and 
Zhu’s (2011) examination of EU states, for instance, suggests that increased migration may 
increase welfare benefits if left-party strength or union density is high. Taylor-Gooby (2005) 
finds that the effects of the left’s strength can counteract those of diversity. In a study of twenty-
one countries over twenty years, Banting et al. (2006) find that the impact on social spending 
may be weakly conditional on the strength of multicultural policies.  
Survey data also suggest that the immigration-redistribution link is nuanced. Mau and 
Burkhardt (2009) find that migration and ethnic diversity do not have a simple direct effect on 
public attitudes, but rather are mediated by institutional factors such as “whether inclusion is 
institutionally organized and whether social benefits schemes have been constructed in such a 
way that they reinforce or lessen conflicts over redistribution” (2009: 226). An examination of 
survey data in 17 European countries by Burgoon et al. (2012) suggests that working in an 
occupational sector that has a high percentage of foreign-born employees actually increases 
support for redistribution, due to increased economic insecurity. Emmenegger and Klemmensen 
(2013) stress the importance of individual motivations other than simple self-interest (such as 
egalitarianism and humanitarianism) in moderating the perceived relationship between attitudes 
toward immigration and redistribution; Brady and Finnigan (N.d.) also emphasize heterogeneity 
in the impact of immigration. 
In short, the relationship between migration and welfare state spending is complex, 
mediated by a number of factors, and may be changing over time. We address this last possibility 
first by seeing if the relationship changes with the addition of ten years of data to the Soroka et al 
(2006) framework. We address the first by considering in some detail not just the direct impact 
of migration on social spending, but the degree to which prima facie evidence for a connection 
between migration and social spending may be produced through other, mediating variables. We 
also explore one facet of conditionality, by examining effects in nine social welfare sub-domains. 
We do so with the expectation that if migration affects social expenditures, it will affect different 
types of welfare programs in different ways.  
Broadly speaking we see two possibilities. First, increased migration may reduce 
spending across all social programs, regardless of how heavily they may be used by immigrants 
or how exposed they may be to moral hazard (Hypothesis 1). Perhaps political backlash against 
increasing migration pushes voters and governments to the right, and this ideological shift 
reduces support for social welfare programs of all kinds. As a result, the negative effects of 
increasing migration on social welfare spending would be equally evident across all social 
welfare policies. A second possibility is that increased migration reduces commitment to specific 
programs that are – or are perceived to be – more likely to be used by migrants (Hypothesis 2). In 
this instance, the effects of increasing migration on social welfare spending are policy-specific, 
and evidenced in certain types of programs. On the arithmetic, it is possible for Hypothesis 2 to 
hold even if Hypothesis 1 does not, and vice versa. 
What types of programs might be most prone to welfare-chauvinist pressures?    The 
existing literature points to several possibilities.  One critical distinction seems to be between 
universal and targeted programs. Because universal programs benefit everyone and do not draw 
invidious boundaries, they tend to receive higher levels of support (see, e.g., van Oorschot 2000, 
Rothstein 1998; Ove Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003). Health care would 
be an obvious example. Targeted programs lead non-beneficiaries to schemes of private 
provision, which in turn diminishes their political investment in public provision. At the same 
time, the very drawing of boundaries encourages categorical thinking and promotes a discourse 
of moral hazard. A second distinction is between contributory and non-contributory programs. 
Contributory programs internalize costs and benefits, even as they restrict the scope for moral-
hazard discourse. Although several welfare programs are ostensibly contributory, the zone where 
the distinction matters most is for pensions. Contributory schemes mask the extent to which 
pensions are transfers between generations, and thus from one group to another. The literature on 
program-specific resilience has not addressed vulnerability to immigration pressure, in particular. 
But the general logic of the universality/targeted and contributory/non-contributory distinctions 
extends directly to pressure from increased immigrant numbers. 
Data 
For social spending we draw on OECD SOCX data. The most recent version includes total social 
spending alongside spending in nine subdomains: old age, survivors, incapacity-related, health, 
family, active labour market policies, unemployment, housing, and “other.” Spending variables 
are represented as percentage (for levels) or percentage points (for changes) of GDP. Expressing 
spending this way has both advantages and disadvantages. A negative relationship between 
migration and social spending could reflect decreases in the numerator, as anti-immigrant 
politics reduce outlays, precisely the mechanism of interest. But it could also reflect increases in 
the denominator, reflecting a boost to GDP that comes with immigration, either as cause or 
effect. In the end, normalizing to GDP makes spending comparable across countries and over 
long periods. This decision, and our modelling more generally, follow directly on past work — 
in particular, Soroka et al. (2006), which drew in turn on a vast and valuable literature on time-
series cross-sectional (TSCS) modelling of social spending (e.g., Swank, 2002; Huber and 
Stephens, 2001; Hicks, 1999).  
To extend the analysis back to 1970, we link the current SOCX dataset to an older OECD 
dataset dating back in most countries to the 1960s. We combine the two using backward 
interpolation, where percentage changes in the new series are estimated backwards, year-by-year, 
based on the percentage changes in the old series. The method is not perfect, as the series have 
slightly different definitions. That said, differences between the new and old series are relatively 
small, and this is the only means by which to get a spending series that runs for 37 years across 
multiple countries. This spending dataset has annual values.  
Migration data have a different source and a different time frame. Here the source is the 
United Nations, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. These data are 
noisier than the various OECD series. In particular, they are not annual data but rather are 
reported in five-year intervals, roughly tracking national censuses. But the timing of the census 
differs from country to country, so the series has temporal noise. Migration statistics, levels or 
changes, are expressed as percentages of the total population.    
We focus on the 17 OECD countries that are advanced capitalist economies with long-
standing democratic systems. The exclusions are (a) Greece, Spain and Portugal, each of which 
had dictatorships for the early period and a late-developing welfare state, and (b) Switzerland, 
which presents an impenetrable challenge because of a society-wide change in social welfare 
spending, some of which seems to be a shift in accounting methods, in the mid 1990s (see 
Soroka et al. 2006). 
Analysis 
We begin with a highly aggregated, simple cross-sectional analysis that reproduces the logic of 
Soroka et al. (2006). We then extend the analysis to a time series-cross section setup with a five-
year frequency. This enables controls for competing hypotheses, and captures most of the 
elements in the standard models of welfare-state growth. Then we move down the ladder of 
policy aggregation, to look at the nine spending domains separately. Again, we start with the 
simple cross-section and then move to the five-year frequency.   
Total Social Spending  
First we consider the basic bivariate cross-sectional relationship. Figure 1 shows the 1970 -2007 
link between change in the foreign-born share of the population and change in social spending as 
a percent of GDP. The emphasis on change is important. Level of migration (as measured by the 
proportion of the population that is foreign-born) is a standard variable in the literature; but our 
past work suggests that it is not overall levels of migration that matter so much as changes in 
migration flows. Countries with high but stable foreign-born populations, seem to have less 
difficulty in sustaining their historic welfare commitments than countries with smaller but 
rapidly growing migrant populations (Soroka et al. 2006). Similarly, the size of the welfare state 
is set by historic patterns, reflecting coalitions in place before the great post-1970 expansion in 
international migration. Also, the logic of the argument seems to us to pertain to the rate of 
growth in the welfare state, not to static levels. Nowhere does social spending actually decrease 
over this period, as Figure 1 shows. The scatterplot in the figure is accompanied by the bivariate 
OLS regression line and the 95% confidence interval for point estimation. The figure reveals a 
long-term relationship between immigration and social spending that is strong, linear, and 
negative.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Parameters for the relationship in Figure 1 appear in the first column of Table 1. They 
suggest that each percentage point increase in foreign born is associated with, on average, a 0.77 
percentage-point reduction in social spending growth. The second model in Table 1 tests for the 
possibility that the bivariate relationship is an artifact of the starting points in either spending or 
immigration. Higher levels of spending in the early years of our analysis may constrain potential 
upward changes in spending over the time period, and the same may be true for the initial size of 
the foreign-born population. As it turns out, including the 1970 levels for spending or 
immigration makes little difference; neither control is statistically significant, and the estimated 
effect of migration change barely changes. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The evidence in Figure 1 and Table 1 is spartan, to say the least. It will be more 
persuasive if the basic relationships hold as we move to a more elaborate suite of controls and 
higher temporal frequencies. Controls also enable us to gauge if any of the effect of immigration 
is indirect, through shifts in the party system for instance. In constructing the estimations, we 
respect the frequency of the migration data, so five years is the maximum frequency and the only 
one we report in tables. To get to annual estimations would require interpolation for the 
immigration data, which would build in serially correlated errors as an artifact. Equally to the 
point, migration requires time for its effects to be felt in policy. This will be visible in the tables 
that follow. Instead of interpolation for missing years on the dependent variable, we aggregate 
independent variables across years to reflect the unfolding of policy change. For instance, the 
dependent variable is the difference between current five-year-averaged spending and lagged 
five-year averaged spending (1995-1999 minus 1990-1994, and so on). The same is true for other 
variables that appear as changes. Only the change in the percentage foreign-born is based solely 
on data spaced five years apart.  
Our choice of controls mirrors the welfare state literature; the justification for each is 
given in some detail in Soroka et al. (2006). The variables are: (1) population under 15 years, (2) 
population over 64 years, (3) trade union density, (4) female labour force participation, (5) 
unemployment, (6) inflation, (7) percent right-wing cabinet posts, and (8) percent left-wing 
cabinet posts. These variables capture the main demographic, economic and political drivers of 
total social spending. Political factors are lagged one year before collapsing to the five-year 
average, given that expenditures in the current year are the consequence of budgetary policy in 
the previous year. This means that the partisanship of government is included at t-1, and so is 
immigration. All other variables appear as changes to the current year.   
Table 2 starts with current changes in spending regressed only on lagged changes in the 
percent foreign born; the second adds the remaining political effects, that is, the measures of 
partisanship of government in lagged levels, as well as all the economic variables in concurrent 
changes. The third and fourth columns provide two robustness checks: we first add lagged levels 
of spending, on the possibility that the system has autoregressive tendencies; we then add a time 
trend, to ensure that preceding results are not the consequence of a general upward trend in 
dependent and independent variables. We present fixed-effects estimations, to account for time-
constant unobserved country-level heterogeneity.   
[Table 2 about here] 
The critical coefficients, for changes in the percentage foreign born, are in the top row. 
Immigration is statistically significant in the first, bivariate model.  Consider what this means: 
none of the effect of immigration here reflects differences across countries, given the fixed-
effects setup.  The coefficient thus reflects the over-time impact of immigration on spending, 
within countries – and the relationship between changes in immigration and changes in spending 
is quite clearly negative.  Once other variables enter, however, the immigration effect shrinks. 
Indeed, entering the full suite of controls reduces the direct effect of migration markedly.  This 
suggests that some of the total impact of immigration is mediated by other factors.  
Exploring this mediation speaks to the possibility that migration matters for social 
spending not just directly, but indirectly (through demographics, for instance.)  It is accordingly 
worth mulling over some diagnostics.  Which demographic/economic variables might be 
conveying the impact of migration on social spending?  Intuition and past work (e.g., Swank 
2002, Huber and Stephens 2001; Soroka et al. 2006) suggest the potential importance of three 
variables in particular, each of which has a significant impact on social spending in Table 2: (1) 
unemployment, which may be positively related to migration, (2) under-15s, also positively 
related to migration, and (3) female labour force participation, negatively related to migration. 
Table 3 presents diagnostic analyses for each of these mediating variables. The table 
captures the two steps in the mediation process. The first step is to estimate the impact of 
immigration on each demographic mediator. This is shown in the top row, which presents 
coefficients capturing the effect of a 1-unit change in migrant stock (at t-1) on each potential 
mediating variable (in changes at t), from a simple bivariate TSCS fixed-effects estimation.  The 
second step is to show what happens to the effect of immigration on the spending variable when 
the mediator is dropped from the estimation. This is akin to reduced-form estimation, when the 
putative mediator is removed. Coefficients on this row should be compared with the coefficient 
(-0.277) in the rightmost column of Table 2. If any coefficient on the second row of Table 3 is 
substantially greater in absolute value than -0.277, we have prima facie evidence that the 
putative mediator is an actual one. Put another way, we can infer that the omitted variable is a 
key carrier of the effect from immigration. The interpretation is all the more persuasive as gains 
indicated by the second row correspond to values on the first row. 
Of course, the potential for one of the variables in Table 3 to be a mediator of 
immigration effects is linked to the direction of the relationship between both immigration and 
the mediator, and the mediator and immigration. Consider the following possibility: immigration 
leads to more unemployment; but immigration pulls spending downwards and unemployment 
pulls spending upwards.  In this instance, the impact of immigration is not mediated by 
unemployment – unemployment should increase rather than decrease the estimated impact of 
immigration.  We are able to explore these possibilities here.  The existing literature suggests the 
likely direction of effects, of course, but the models themselves will expose effects regardless of 
their direction.   
[Table 3 about here]   
Results in Table 3 are telling. To start, none of the impact from migration runs through 
unemployment. The regression of changes in unemployment on lagged changes in migration, in 
the first column of Table 3, reveals no significant relationship between the two variables.  The 
sign of the coefficient is the opposite of the widely-held expectation – indeed, in only seven of 
the 17 countries is the immigration-unemployment relationship positive. This fits with a growing 
body of work suggesting that migration is, at most, only very weakly connected to 
unemployment rates (see, e.g., Brücker 2012). It leaves open the possibility that immigration 
may be linked to reduced spending by decreasing unemployment, though this also does not 
appear to be the case: dropping unemployment from the fully-specified model makes no real 
difference to the immigration coefficient; indeed the value in Table 3 is lower than in Table 2. 
Change in the age structure is not the culprit either. The relationship with immigration is 
quite strong: a percentage-point increase in immigration yields a 0.26 increase in the under-15 
share of the overall population. This positive relationship appears in 13 of the 17 countries. That 
said, as shown in the bottom-middle cell, dropping the under-15 variable from the model yields 
no real change in the coefficient for migration. Migration matters for the size of the young 
population, to be sure; and based on results in Table 2, the presence of under-15s clearly 
increases social spending.  But the impact is not a by-product of migration. 
Female labour force participation appears to be the key. A percentage-point increase in 
migration cuts nearly half a percentage point from growth in female participation. This is 
consistent with existing work  (in the Canadian case, see Kustec 2012). The effect is not 
universal — just ten countries show a clearly negative relationship between the two variables — 
but the average effect is very robust. And female participation is clearly a mediator of the 
immigration effect. Dropping change in female participation from the saturated model produces 
a coefficient for immigration (-0.339) that is markedly higher than in the rightmost column of 
Table 2.  
How exactly does female labour force participation affect social spending?  There are 
several possibilities. (See Huber and Stephens 2000 for a useful discussion.)  One account 
focuses on political mobilization: labour force participation will change (and increase) women’s 
demands for a more comprehensive welfare state.  This likely occurs over the medium to long 
term, however, perhaps beyond the 5-year window examined in our analyses.  It is more likely 
that that the relatively short-term impact we observe here is related to increases in spending that 
result from a larger labour force, requiring increased expenses related to employment insurance, 
training, leave, and so on.  
Even over a five-year span, immigration is negatively related to social spending. This is 
the message of the simple relationship in the leftmost column of Table 2. The summary effect is 
complicated by the short-term dynamics in spending itself, which has an autoregressive tendency 
(indicated by the significant negative effect of lagged spending in the third column of Table 2). 
This complication should not distract us from the total effect, however. That said, the effect does 
not appear to just be a function of immigration per se – it is in part a result of other changes in 
the demographic and economic landscape related to immigration. The primary mediator of 
impact appears to be female labour force participation: immigration reduces the female 
participation rate, sufficiently to account for much of the attenuation in the direct effect of 
immigration (the contrast along the top row between the middle and the rightmost columns in 
Table 2).  
By-Domain Social Spending  
Does the impact of immigration extend all the way across the welfare policy landscape? Broadly 
speaking, targeted programs may be more vulnerable than universal ones, as noted above. Table 
4 provides a first test of the possibility that (a) increased migration reduces spending across all 
social programs, regardless of moral hazard, or (b) increased migration reduces commitment to 
specific programs that are – or are perceived to be – more open to use by migrants. 
By-domain spending is not available for the 1970s, so estimations rely on 1980-2007 
changes. This is true for most cases, at least — for several countries spending in certain domains 
is not available until the mid-1980s, so estimations in Table 4 are based on slightly varying time 
periods, beginning in a domain the first year in which spending is available for all countries. For 
economy of presentation, Table 4 includes just the coefficient for changes in migration. The first 
set of coefficients is based on the same cross-sectional model as in Table 1. The second set is 
based on simplified versions of the setup in Table 2, including just changes in migrant stock and 
lagged levels of spending (corresponding to the second model in that table). 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the paired-down approach to modeling used in 
Table 4. The appropriate control variables will differ across sub-domains — age will matter for 
old-age spending, unemployment will matter for unemployment spending, and so on. Although 
models in Table 4 do not account exhaustively for variance in spending change nor do they 
afford detailed exploration of mediators, the alternative may be worse. Building ideal by-domain 
models reduces across-domain comparability.  Consider the following possibility: in one domain 
the impact of immigration on spending change is entirely unmediated, so the addition of controls 
makes no difference to our findings; in another, the impact of immigration is mediated by a 
control variable, and so the addition of controls masks the broader relationship. Here, for the 
time being at least, we care just about that broader, (nearly) bivariate relationship between 
immigration and spending change.  We accordingly rely on basic, comparable models in Table 4 
– though we do take up the issue of additional controls below. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Of the 18 coefficients in Table 4, only five are clearly different from zero and negative in 
sign. (The one borderline coefficient, for health spending in the TSCS column, has a positive 
sign.) With one exception, the domains that stand out correspond to targeted spending. The one 
domain to feature in both cross-sectional and TSCS estimations is spending on the unemployed. 
Also leaping from the TSCS column is spending on active labour market policies (ALMP). 
These are policy domains whose beneficiaries are numerically limited and vulnerable to being 
represented as abusers of the system. This is all the more striking in that, according to Table 3, 
immigration is at best weakly related to the actual rate of unemployment. The implication is that 
the mechanism is not economic, but political. From a strictly economic perspective, the negative 
impact of immigration on ALMP spending makes even less sense than for unemployment, 
insofar as such programs are designed to increase labour market participation, presumably for 
immigrants as well as others. Here, too, what matters may be politics, symbolic politics in fact.   
Further to the theme of vulnerability for targeted programs, is the TSCS evidence for the 
“other” category. The contents of this residual category vary somewhat from one country to the 
next, but the SOCX definition is illuminating: “other” includes programs that do not fit into the 
other categories, including social expenditure related to immigrants and indigenous people, and 
more importantly (in terms of spending levels), income support and social assistance payments 
(OECD 2007). “Other” spending comprises precisely the kind policies that we hypothesize as 
vulnerable to immigration politics. 
Pension spending merits discussion. As a universal domain, why is it vulnerable in the 
first place? Pensions may be vulnerable because of their peculiar juxtaposition of universality 
and delayed access to benefits. Most persons ultimately entitled to a pension are not currently 
receiving one. Schemes where benefits, although delayed, are tied to contributions may be less 
politically vulnerable. In eight of our 17 countries, pension schemes are almost entirely 
contributory: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the US. In 
the other nine, the pension systems combine contributory and non-contributory elements: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the UK. For 
the countries with entirely contributory pension schemes, the immigration coefficient is -0.215 (p 
= 0.09).  Where there is a significant non-contributory element, the coefficient is -0.409 (p = 
0.04).  In short, changes in immigration appear to be negatively associated with spending on old-
age programs only in those countries where a significant portion of pensions spending is non-
contributory. 
That said, why are results for pensions evident only in the cross-sectional estimation? Our 
own suspicion is that to capture pension politics the five-year frequency is simply too high. The 
pension clientele is broad and the successful mobilization of political will for structural change is 
rare and highly conditional (Jacobs 2011). What is more, the impact of current structural change 
is delayed, as part of the bargain usually requires that current pensioners be insulated against 
change in their entitlement. It strikes us as eminently reasonable that pensions respond to multi-
decade changes in the foreign-born share of the population, not to five-year ones.  That said, we 
cannot fully rule out the possibility that our results for pensions are spurious – evidence of an 
effect at one frequency, and no such evidence at another, is troubling.  Take our interpretation 
here as partly conjectural, then.  Non-contributory pensions may be negatively affected by 
immigration, in line with our expectations.  Even if they are not, the domains which are most 
likely to be associated (incorrectly) with immigration – unemployment, ALMP, and ‘other’ 
immigration and welfare programs – are the ones most clearly affected by immigration.  
Just as importantly as the effects that do occur are the ones that do not. Clearly, some 
areas of social spending are affected by migration, but others — including many of the largest — 
are not. Migration matters to social welfare expenditure. The effect appears to be more political 
than economic. And the impact is felt only in certain domains.   
What about mediators of the effects shown in Table 4?  Does immigration continue to 
matter (directly) even when other variables are added to the model, or is there evidence that the 
impact of immigration is mediated by other factors, as we have seen in estimates of total social 
spending?  We do not present detailed estimates here of the extent to which the impact of 
immigration on by-domain spending is mediated by other factors. The necessary, fully-specified 
by-domain results are partly constrained by a lack of data. (Recall that those estimates rely on 
data from 1980, and sometimes even more recently, forwards.)  But we are not entirely reluctant 
to investigate further the potential mediators of immigration effects in by-domain results.  Our 
own diagnostic results suggest the following.  
First, in no domain does adding a full (or partial) set of control variables reveal 
statistically significant effects of immigration change where they do not already exist in the 5-
year results in Table 4; put differently, the identification of a significant impact of immigration 
does not appear to be contingent on the inclusion of controls for any of the seven domains with 
insignificant immigration coefficients in Table 4.  Where ALMP and unemployment spending is 
concerned, the inclusion of macroeconomics as well as female labour force participation leads to 
a statistically insignificant immigration variable.  None of these variables seems to be a culprit 
on its own, however – it is the combined inclusion of the three that seems to matter.  For ‘other’ 
spending, the inclusion of all controls makes no difference – a fully-specified model has an 
immigration coefficient of -.067, only very marginally (and insignificantly) smaller than the -
.070 in Table 4.  This is the domain in which the negative impact of immigration is the most 
robust.  It is also a strong indication that the impact of immigration on social spending is 
political. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Two critical points from earlier work remain relevant. First is the importance of focusing on 
changes in migration rather than levels of migration. Existing work often focuses on the latter. In 
doing so, it tends to emphasize cross-national variance rather than within-country variance over 
time. Analyses draw their power from variance across countries and thus incorporate other 
features of the countries’ history, even as hypotheses are based on political effects within 
countries. The current political effect of migration cannot be adequately observed without 
moving to an estimation that focuses on changes in immigrant flows. Second, the effect of 
migration takes place over the medium-term. Annual estimations are thus not the most 
appropriate way to capture the impact of migration; indeed, while the impact is clear in our five-
year models, it is totally absent from annual models. This makes good sense. Public reactions to 
increasing migration are bound to take some time — there needs to be migration, the public 
needs to notice that migration and change their preferences accordingly, and then those 
preferences have to find their way into political and budgetary processes. Besides, annual 
immigration data are dubious constructs, interpolations from quinquennial (at best) census 
exercises. 
This paper also points to the advantages of disaggregating spending. There is strong 
evidence here for our Hypothesis 2, that the impact of immigration varies across policy domains. 
In most domains there is essentially no evidence of a relationship. In other domains, the impact is 
clear, and variation across domains is telling. The impact of immigration is most pronounced for 
labour market policy, unemployment spending in particular, but also for active labour market 
policy outlays. “Other” spending is also vulnerable, not surprisingly for it is in this domain that 
outlays specifically targeted at immigrants are housed. 
Although the magnitude of effects should not be overstated, effects do cumulate, over 
time and across domains. As our estimations of total spending suggest: a one-percentage point 
increase in the foreign-born share over 37 years is associated with a nearly 0.8-percentage point 
damping of increases in spending. And given measurement error in our data, effects are probably 
underestimated. More generally, the existing literature may both under- and over-state 
relationships. Overall effects are mediated and modest, but when we drill down to specific 
domains, typically those serving the most marginal economic actors, impacts are not small.   
There clearly is more to do. Our exploration of mediating variables points to the 
importance, perhaps now at the subdomain level, of examining the ways in which immigration 
may indirectly matter for social welfare spending. We also see some potential for work that more 
carefully distinguishes between (upward) pressures on spending due to increasing numbers of 
people in need and (downward) pressures on spending for political reasons. Our analyses also 
assume that the immigration-welfare state link is the same everywhere, such that different 
outcomes are solely the result of different values for component variables. But Figure 1 also 
strongly suggests that there is considerable scope for variation in response to immigration 
pressures. The pattern in the figure is clearly heteroscedastic: residuals get bigger as immigration 
changes get bigger. Note, for instance, that the vertical gap between the Netherlands and 
Germany, with essentially identical (high) growth in the percentage foreign-born, is as large as 
that between Canada and France, with markedly different (low to moderate) migration histories. 
One possibility, probed in Banting et al. (2006), is the conditioning role of multicultural policy. 
Such policies may reshape the discourse of immigrant reception and buy insulation; or they may 
do the opposite. Another possible conditioning factor may be shape of the ex ante welfare state. 
Universal domains are more resilient than targeted ones in the face of immigration pressure. 
Perhaps the same is true at the level of the overall system: do universal systems resist or 
accommodate immigration pressure better than conservative or liberal regimes? Multiculturalism 
policy and pre-existing welfare regimes may interact. Our reading of the literature and our own 
work converge in suggesting that the negative impact of immigration on welfare spending can be 
moderated by political and policy institutions. It follows that future work should take 
heterogeneity — in both spending domains and institutions — into account. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Variable Sources 
Social Welfare Spending: all measures are drawn from the OECD SOCX databases. 
Migrants, % Population: data drawn from the UN, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 
2008 Revision; as data are reported in five year intervals, we use linear interpolation to fill in 
missing years. 
Population under 15yrs: annual data from OECDStat. 
Population over 64yrs: same as above. 
Unemployment: same as above. 
Female Labour Force: same as above. 
Trade Union Density: same as above. 
Right, % Cabinet Posts: data from Soroka et al. 2006 updated using Armingeon et al., 
Comparative Political Data Set III, 1990-2008. 
Left, % Cabinet Posts: same as above. 
 
[Appendix Tables 1 through 4 about here] 
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Figure 1. Changes in Foreign-Born Population and Changes in Social Spending, 17-country 
OECD sample, 1970-2007 
 
 
Table 1.  Cross-Sectional Models, Changes in Total Social 
Spending, 1970 to 2007, 17-country OECD sample 
 
 DV: ∆ Spending, % GDP t 
   
∆ Foreign Born, % Populationt -0.774***  -0.764***  
  (0.172)  (0.181)  
Spending, % GDPt=1970  -0.139  
   (0.141)  
Foreign Born, % 
Populationt=1970  -0.111  
   (0.106)  
Constant 12.815***  15.336***  
  (1.060)  (2.311)  
   
N 17 
Rsq 0.574  0.621  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells contain coefficients from an 
OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Total Social Spending, 5-Year TSCS Analysis, 1970-2007 
 
 DV: ∆ Spending, % GDP t 
     
∆ Foreign Born, % Popt-1 -0.458* -0.197 -0.188 -0.277 
  (0.274) (0.206) (0.182) (0.185) 
Right, % Cabinet Postst-1  0.141 0.037 0.103 
   (0.699) (0.616) (0.608) 
Left, % Cabinet Postst-1  0.173 0.117 0.144 
  (0.729) (0.643) (0.634) 
∆ Population under 15yrst  0.377** 0.395*** 0.358*** 
   (0.148) (0.131) (0.130) 
∆ Population over 64yrst  0.094 0.198 0.111 
   (0.282) (0.249) (0.250) 
∆ Unemploymentt  0.414*** 0.443*** 0.462*** 
  (0.068) (0.060) (0.060) 
12-month Inflation Ratet  0.078 -0.073 -0.035 
  (0.049) (0.051) (0.054) 
∆ Female Labour Forcet  0.510*** 0.375*** 0.422*** 
  (0.155) (0.139) (0.139) 
∆ Trade Union Densityt  0.090** 0.023 0.025 
   (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) 
Spending, % GDPt-1   -0.244*** -0.311*** 
   (0.044) (0.055) 
Time Trend    0.220** 
    (0.110) 
Constant 1.458*** 0.347 5.867*** 5.447*** 
  (0.231) (0.618) (1.134) (1.137) 
     
N 130 
N (panels) 17 
Rsq (overall) 0.045 0.482 0.415 0.341 
Rsq (between) 0.440 0.043 0.010 0.003 
Rsq (within) 0.024 0.531 0.639 0.653 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain coefficients (with standard 
errors in parentheses) from a fixed-effects TSCS model, using a GLS 
estimation. 
Table 3.  Relationships Between Changes in Migrant Stock and Three Mediating Variables 
 
 Economic/Demographic Variables 
 ∆ Unemploymentt ∆ Population  under 15yrst 
∆ Female  
Labour Forcet 
    
Impact of ∆ Foreign Bornt-1  
on Econ/Demo variables a 
-0.312  0.261**  -0.437*** 
(0.287)  (0.129)  (0.147) 
    
Impact of ∆ Foreign Bornt-1 on ∆ 
Spendingt when Econ/Demo 
variable is removed b 
-0.218 -0.271 -0.339* 
(0.230) (0.190) (0.190) 
    
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) 
from a TSCS model, using a fixed-effects GLS estimation. 
a Coefficients are drawn from TSCS fixed-effects models in which each Y is regressed on ∆ Foreign 
Bornt-1 (with no additional controls). 
b Based on the fully-saturated models of social spending, as in Table 2, but where each Y is dropped 
from the estimation (holding the sample constant).  
Table 4.  Subdomain Social Spending, Various Models, 1980-2007 
 
Domain Cross-Sectional Models a 
TSCS Models b 
Fixed Effects 
     
Old Age -0.514***  (.118)  0.036  (0.110)  
Survivors -0.028  (.077)  -0.025  (0.051)  
Incapacity 0.026  (.090)  0.004  (0.069)  
Health -0.083  (.063)  0.109  (0.085)  
Family 0.012  (.062)  0.024  (0.057)  
ALMP -0.017  (.029)  -0.093**  (0.039)  
Unemp’t -0.140**  (.058)  -0.155**  (0.077)  
Housing -0.001  (.042)  0.007  (0.020)  
Other -0.023 (.026) -0.070** (0.031) 
     
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.  a Cells contain coefficients from 
an OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Complete 
results are shown in Appendix Table 3. b Cells contain coefficients 
(with standard errors in parentheses) from TSCS models, using fixed-
effects GLS estimations.  Complete results are shown in Appendix 
Table 4. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Basic Descriptive Data for Countries Included in TSCS Analyses 
 
 Cross-Sectional Data 5-yr Time-Series Data 
Country 1970-2007 % change in Migrant Stock 
1970-2007 % 
change in Spending 
# 5-yr intervals in 
TSCS Models 
Average Migrants (% 
of population) 
Australia 2.216 10.094 8 20.365 
Austria 5.613 8.239 8 10.881 
Belgium 1.507 11.437 8 8.595 
Canada 5.237 6.084 8 16.486 
Denmark 5.809 8.420 7 4.965 
Finland 2.944 12.161 8 1.551 
France 0.378 13.041 8 10.575 
Germany 8.792 8.325 8 8.568 
Ireland 12.269 5.995 7 8.141 
Italy 4.493 10.520 8 2.760 
Japan 0.932 13.720 8 0.954 
Netherlands 8.587 0.443 6 7.712 
New Zealand 6.940 8.070 7 16.535 
Norway 6.772 7.853 8 4.468 
Sweden 6.433 9.751 8 8.973 
UK 4.689 7.248 7 7.049 
USA 7.457 5.977 8 9.008 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Data SOCX Data, by subdomain 
 
 Total 
Spending, 
% of GDP 
 
Subdomain spending, % of Total 
 Old 
Age 
Survivors Incapacity Health Family ALMP Unemp Housing Other 
Australia 13.1 25.6 2.4 12.3 33.5 13.6 2.5 7.3 1.8 1.4 
Austria 24.0 39.2 8.4 10.5 23.0 10.9 1.7 4.1 0.4 1.2 
Belgium 24.3 26.3 9.8 11.6 25.1 9.9 4.4 12.0 0.3 1.6 
Canada 16.3 21.7 2.3 6.1 36.8 4.7 2.6 7.8 3.5 15.0 
Denmark 24.8 28.0 0.1 14.2 20.2 12.4 5.3 15.1 2.4 3.8 
Finland 23.2 30.0 4.0 16.4 23.1 11.9 3.9 7.8 1.1 1.8 
France 24.3 36.5 6.7 8.7 25.7 10.6 3.5 5.3 2.9 0.7 
Germany 23.9 36.3 7.0 8.3 30.0 7.7 4.1 5.1 1.1 1.1 
Ireland 15.6 21.2 6.2 10.7 32.6 11.1 6.2 10.1 3.3 1.6 
Italy 20.7 44.9 10.3 8.9 26.6 4.4 2.0 3.5 0.0 0.1 
Japan 12.5 38.1 8.1 5.0 38.7 3.9 1.9 3.4  1.5 
Netherlands 23.3 24.7 2.6 21.0 23.8 7.5 5.4 9.8 1.6 3.7 
New Zealand 17.6 31.0 1.1 12.4 30.0 13.0 3.4 5.5 2.5 1.2 
Norway 19.9 30.8 1.7 20.8 17.6 13.5 3.4 3.1 0.8 3.3 
Sweden 28.2 30.3 2.2 17.0 23.8 12.6 6.2 4.2 2.5 2.3 
UK 18.1 26.8 3.9 11.1 28.7 12.9 2.6 5.1 6.6 2.4 
USA 14.1 36.8 6.4 7.7 37.3 4.3 1.3 3.1  3.3 
Note: Cells contain mean values, based on annual data. Total spending is based on all years from 1970 forward; 
subdomain spending is based on all available data (from 1980 forward). Total spending is an annual average of 
spending/GDP.  Subdomain spending is, for diagnostic purposes, shown as an annual average of the value as a 
percent of total spending — though note that analyses use subdomain spending as a percent of GDP. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 3.  Subdomain Social Spending, Full Cross-Sectional Models, 1970-2007 
 
 DV: ∆ Spending, % GDP t 
 Old Age Survivors Incapacity Health Family 
∆ Foreign Born, % Popt -.514***  -.028  .026  -.083  .012  
  (.118)  (.077)  (.090)  (.063)  (.062)  
Spending, % GDPt=1970 -.187  -.454  -.492***  -.833***  -.333*  
  (.151)  (.301)  (.161)  (.161)  (.173)  
Foreign Born, % Popt=1970 -.192***  -.018  .002  .028  .014  
  (.061)  (.036)  (.049)  (.031)  (.032)  
Constant 6.131***  .645  1.039  5.886***  .854  
  (1.172)  (.716)  (.763)  (.902)  (.542)  
N 17 17 17 17 17 
Rsq .711  .161  .455  .754  .237  
 
 DV: ∆ Spending, % GDP t 
 ALMP Unemployment Housing Other 
∆ Foreign Born, % Popt -.017  -.140**  -.001  -.023 
  (.029)  (.058)  (.042)  (.026) 
Spending, % GDPt=1970 -.500**  -.616***  -1.018**  .052 
  (.179)  (.128)  (.373)  (.143) 
Foreign Born, % Popt=1970 -.017  -.010  .006  .003 
  (.015)  (.029)  (.021)  (.014) 
Constant .533**  1.183***  .403  .142 
  (.224)  (.392)  (.293)  (.172) 
N 17 17 15 17 
Rsq .423  .746  .431  .062 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Cells contain coefficients from an OLS regression with standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Appendix Table 4.  Subdomain Social Spending, Full 5-Year TSCS Model 
 
FIXED EFFECTS DV: ∆ Spending, % GDP t 
 Old Age Survivors Incapacity Health Family 
∆ Foreign Born, % Popt-1 0.036  -0.025  0.004  0.109  0.024  
  (0.110)  (0.051)  (0.069)  (0.085)  (0.057)  
Spending, % GDPt-1 -0.346***  -0.496***  -0.455***  -0.345***  -0.518***  
  (0.081)  (0.084)  (0.089)  (0.074)  (0.091)  
Constant 2.475***  0.512***  1.208***  2.179***  1.155***  
  (0.556)  (0.090)  (0.234)  (0.410)  (0.191)  
N 85 85 85 85 85 
N (panels) 17 17 17 17 17 
Rsq (overall) 0.219  0.374  0.298  0.249  0.335  
 ALMP Unemp’t Housing Other  
∆ Foreign Born, % Popt-1 -0.093**  -0.155**  0.007  -0.070**  
  (0.039)  (0.077)  (0.020)  (0.031)  
Spending, % GDPt-1 -0.680***  -0.567***  -0.559***  -0.806***  
  (0.114)  (0.091)  (0.079)  (0.097)  
Constant 0.642***  0.868***  0.269***  0.494***  
 (0.101)  (0.153)  (0.039)  (0.058)  
N 70 84 71 85  
N (panels) 17 17 15 17  
Rsq (overall) 0.464  0.394  0.483  0.541  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; ** p < .01. Cells contain coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) from a TSCS 
model, using GLS estimations. 
 
